

2026 PA Super 239

MARIA GABRIEL GARCIA

Appellant

V.

ARMANDO AUGUSTIN Y AUGUSTIN

: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA

: No. 3176 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Order Entered November 17, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Civil Division at
No(s): CV-2025-000685

BEFORE: McLAUGHLIN, J., SULLIVAN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.*

CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINION BY SULLIVAN, J.:

FILED OCTOBER 26, 2026

I agree with the majority that the trial court’s decision in this case was problematic in light of ***Velasquez v. Miranda***, 321 A.3d 876 (Pa. 2024), and more recent decisions of this Court. I also agree with the majority’s decision to remand this matter for further proceedings to confirm whether the trial court had jurisdiction. However, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s limited mandate on remand, which would require the trial court to enter the predicate special immigrant juvenile (“SIJ”) determinations if jurisdiction is proper.¹ A review of ***Velasquez***, the relevant case law, and the record in the present appeal constrain me to conclude ***Velasquez*** is distinguishable and it would be inappropriate for this Court to require such determinations as a

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

¹ **See** 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(27)(J).

matter of law, particularly with respect to the predicate SIJ best interest determination.

By way of preliminary background, Maria Gabriel Garcia (“Mother”) married Armando Agustin y Agustin (“Father”) in Guatemala when she was fifteen or sixteen years old.² Mother and Father had four children—their two daughters, who are the subjects of the present appeal, K.R.A.G. (born June 2007) and A.R.A.G. (born January 2012) (collectively “Children”)—as well as two sons (collectively, “sons”). Mother left Guatemala with sons shortly after Father abandoned the family in approximately 2017, and she had been living in the United States for at least seven years by the time of the October 2025 hearing in this case. **See** N.T., 10/1/25, at 31.³

After Mother left with sons, Children remained in Guatemala under the care of their maternal grandmother (“Maternal Grandmother”). **See id.**

² As noted by the majority, the record contains several variations of the spelling of what are presumably Father’s familial names including the custody complaint’s using “Augustin” and “Agustin,” the affidavit of service and other filings using “Agustin,” as well as other entries referring to “Agostino.” This writing adopts that the partial spelling given by Mother at the October 2025 hearing in this case and spelling captioned in the notice of appeal.

³ Mother obtained predicate SIJ determinations for sons in 2023, and she attached to her proposed findings of fact in the present case the prior determinations of a different Delaware County judge, as well as portions of the record concerning sons. Mother previously testified in greater detail in sons’ case than this case about the abuse Father inflicted against her when he was drunk, Father’s lack of financial support for the family, and his abandonment of family. **Compare** Proposed Findings of Fact, Exhibit A (N.T., 3/31/23, at 26-35 (indicating, *inter alia*, Father would push Mother hard against a wall, rip off her clothes, and pull her hair)) **with** N.T., 10/1/25, at 24-27.

K.R.A.G. testified she and A.R.A.G. later moved to live with Father's parents ("Paternal Grandparents") because Paternal Grandparents' home was closer to K.R.A.G.'s school. **See id.** at 38. K.R.A.G. became pregnant while in Guatemala. K.R.A.G. testified Paternal Grandparents "mistreated [her and her sister] verbally[,]" which got worse when they found out K.R.A.G. was pregnant. **Id.** at 37. K.R.A.G. and A.R.A.G. left Guatemala and had been in the United States with Mother for approximately one year by the time of the hearing. **See id.** at 31.⁴

In January 2025, Mother filed the underlying complaint for custody requesting predicate SIJ determinations for Children. Mother's complaint listed Children's last residence in Guatemala as Paternal Grandparents' home, where Children lived from 2022 until June 2024, and indicated Children have been living with Mother, her partner, and Children's siblings and half-siblings in Chester City since September 2024. **See** Complaint for Custody, 1/23/25, at 2.⁵ Mother's counsel suggested Mother's "relative" in Guatemala served Father by handing a copy of the complaint to Paternal Grandmother with whom Father resides, and mailed other updates, which the trial court indicated

⁴ K.R.A.G.'s child was seven months old at the time of the hearing. **See** N.T., 10/1/25, at 30. K.R.A.G. testified Maternal Grandmother passed away. **See id.** at 38.

⁵ As noted above, Mother had four Children with Father in Guatemala. Mother has two children with her current partner.

“seem[ed] reasonable”. N.T., 6/4/25, at 5, 28.⁶ Father did not file an acknowledgment of service and did not otherwise participate in any of the proceedings on the complaint. Mother also filed petitions for expedited relief seeking custody determinations with the predicate SIJ findings before K.R.A.G. turned eighteen in June 2025.⁷ The trial court declined to expedite the scheduling of the hearing and, following the hearing in October 2025, entered the order granting Mother sole legal custody and primary physical custody of A.R.A.G. but denying the requests for predicate SIJ determinations. Mother timely appealed.

In ***Velasquez***, our Supreme Court explained that “SIJ is an immigration classification that provides humanitarian protection for certain minors located in the United States.” ***Velasquez***, 321 A.3d at 882. The federal Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”), in relevant part, affords SIJ status to a child immigrant, who is present in the United States, and:

(i) who has been declared dependent on a juvenile court located in the United States or whom such a court has legally committed to, or placed under the custody of, an agency or department of a State, or an individual or entity appointed by a State or juvenile court located in the United States, and whose reunification with 1 or both of the immigrant’s parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law; [and]

⁶ The record contains a photograph of a letter signed by the person who served Father with the complaint.

⁷ As noted by the majority, this Court has held that a trial court retains jurisdiction to issue the predicate SIJ determinations, even if the child turned eighteen during the pendency of the proceedings. **See** Majority Opinion at 20 n.5.

(ii) for whom it has been determined in administrative or judicial proceedings that it would not be in the alien's best interest to be returned to the alien's or parent's previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence[.]

8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i)-(ii) ("subsection (J)") (emphasis added). As **Velasquez** recognized, a state court does not make an ultimate immigration decision: the United States Citizens and Immigration Services ("USCIS"), an agency under the United States Department of Homeland Security, makes that decision. **See Velasquez**, 321 A.3d at 883, 895. Still, an immigrant child seeking SIJ status "must come to USCIS bearing a state court order with the requisite judicial determinations—and their factual basis—regarding dependency or custody, reunification, and the child's best interest." **Id.** Thus, a Pennsylvania court, with appropriate jurisdiction, is the first stop for an immigrant child seeking SIJ status and the child must obtain the predicate SIJ determinations on: (1) the non-viability of reunification with at least one parent due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under state law and (2) the child's best interest not to be returned to the child's or parent's previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence.⁸

Velasquez principally clarified an issue that previously split this Court, namely, whether a Pennsylvania custody court can issue the predicate SIJ determinations. In that case, the petitioner, Velasquez, left Guatemala with her children ("the children") due, in part, to the children's father's ("father's")

⁸ For the purpose of discussion, I refer to subsection (J)(i) as the predicate SIJ determination on the nonviability reunification with at least one parent and subsection (J)(ii) as the predicate SIJ best interest determination.

physical abuse of Velasquez and neglect of the family. After living in Pennsylvania with children for at least two years, Velasquez filed a custody complaint and requested predicate SIJ determinations, the latter of which the trial court denied. This Court affirmed the denial of the predicate SIJ determinations on a theory Velasquez could not seek predicate SIJ determinations against another parent unless the children were wards of the Commonwealth.

Our Supreme Court rejected that theory and concluded that proceedings in “custody court, which necessarily entail factual findings regarding a child’s best interest and the factors set forth at 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 5328(a), **may** properly support a SIJ-qualifying order for later presentation to USCIS.” **Id.** at 901 (emphasis added). **Velasquez** held that a Pennsylvania custody court, with appropriate jurisdiction, may issue predicate SIJ determinations even if one parent sought custody in Pennsylvania against another parent in a foreign country. **See id.**⁹ The **Velasquez** Court further noted that under the UCCJEA, there is no requirement that a named defendant participate in a custody proceeding. **See id.** at 884 n.2 (noting that “a parent outside the

⁹ As **Velasquez** stated:

In Pennsylvania, the [Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (“UCCJEA”), 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5421-5430,] vests jurisdiction in our common pleas courts to make “child custody determinations” when the Commonwealth is the child’s “home state” and in other circumstances. **See, e.g.,** 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] §§ 5421 (initial custody jurisdiction), 5422 (exclusive, continuing jurisdiction).

Velasquez, 321 A.3d at 898.

Commonwealth is entitled to ‘notice and an opportunity to be heard’ in accordance with our law or the foreign state’s law, but Pennsylvania does not require the absent parent to participate in the proceedings in order for our courts to have jurisdiction over the custody action”).

The **Velasquez** Court further explained the predicate SIJ determination are governed by state law:

Pennsylvania custody courts clearly have authority and guidance under our statutes to make the predicate judicial determinations that would support SIJ classification when conducting their usual, statutorily mandated, holistic best interest analysis under [23 Pa.C.S.A. §] 5328 to determine parental custody. If analysis of the child’s best interest results in a determination that sole legal and physical custody should be with the child’s parent or other individual who resides in the United States, then the court can also make the predicate SIJ judicial determination related to the child’s best interest—that it is in her best interest not to be returned to her country of nationality or habitual residency. Similarly, if the court awards sole legal and physical custody to the U.S.-resident individual, its findings on this question may support the SIJ predicate judicial determination that reunification with the parent located elsewhere is not viable due to that parent’s abuse, abandonment, or neglect of the child, or a similar basis under state law.

Id. at 905 (footnote omitted).

The **Velasquez** Court held, in relevant part, the standard for predicate SIJ determinations is “**not** whether immigration to the United States is in [the c]hildren’s best interest[;]” rather, the standard is whether the facts found by the custody court also support the predicate SIJ determinations of nonviability of reunification and best interests. **Id.** at 905-06 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). The Court noted the petitioner has a burden of establishing

the predicate SIJ determinations by a preponderance of the evidence. **See id.** at 906.

The **Velasquez** Court ultimately concluded the trial court in that case misapplied the proper standards and burdens of proof when considering the request for predicate SIJ determinations under Pennsylvania law. **See id.** at 905-06. Critically, the **Velasquez** Court engaged in a comprehensive review of the record and the trial court's opinion in that case and determined "there [was] no reason to disrupt [the trial court's] credibility determination and factual findings that led to its custody award as they [were] amply supported by the record." **Id.** Those findings and undisturbed credibility determinations, the Court concluded, "demonstrate[d] [the c]hildren's reunification with [the f]ather [wa]s not viable due to abandonment and neglect, and that it [was] in [the c]hildren's best interest not to return to Guatemala." **Id.**

At the outset, I agree with the majority's determination that the record does not conclusively establish whether the trial court had jurisdiction and agree with the decision to remand to settle that question. Moreover, in accordance with **Velasquez** and more recent precedent, I agree with the majority's conclusion that the trial court erred and abused its discretion. As noted in **Velasquez**, a Pennsylvania court does not make the ultimate immigration decision and the question before the trial court is not whether immigration to the United States is in the children's best interest. **See id.** at 895, 905-06. More recently in **Orellana v. Chuva**, 353 A.3d 212 (Pa. Super. 2026), this Court further held that "a party's motivation for seeking the

predicate factual determinations required for [SIJ status] is not within the state court's purview[;]" rather, it is for the USCIS to determine whether the request for SIJ status is bona fide. **Orellana**, 353 A.3d at 220; **accord Garcia v. Perez**, 3038 EDA 2025, 2026 WL 1556148, at *8 (Pa. Super. June 2, 2026) (non-precedential memorandum).¹⁰ Instantly, contrary to **Velasquez** and **Orellana**, the trial court based its sweeping determinations that Mother and Children were incredible based on what it found to be their primary motivation of gaining the immigration benefits of predicate SIJ determinations. **See** Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 10/17/25, at 5, 10.¹¹ For this reason, I concur with the majority that the trial court erred and abused its discretion in refusing to find reunification with Father was not viable due to abandonment or neglect.¹²

¹⁰ There are some indications that the mother in **Garcia**, which was also assigned on this S12-2026 panel, may be related to Mother.

¹¹ There may have been some basis for the trial court to draw question K.R.A.G.'s testimony she had absolutely no contact with Father in the six years after Mother left Guatemala: K.R.A.G. and A.R.A.G. lived with Paternal Grandparents for at least two years until 2024, and Father was living with Paternal Grandparents at the time of service of the complaint. However, there was no record basis for the court to infer Father had ever supported Children financially, academically, or emotionally while they lived in Guatemala.

¹² Moreover, as noted by the majority, to the extent the trial court relied on the lack of documentation to reject the claims of abandonment, neglect, or abuse, the **Velasquez** Court has indicated such documentation is not required and abuse may be established through other credible evidence including testimony. **See Velasquez**, 321 A.3d at 905 n.22.

A review of the record, however, constrains me to dissent from the majority's limited remand to consider only the jurisdictional issue and, if jurisdiction exists, requiring the trial court to enter the predicate SIJ findings. **See** Majority Opinion at 15, 23. The majority asserts **Velasquez** "considered a nearly identical factual case faced by the same [trial] judge" and concludes Mother's Children, like Velasquez's, are entitled to predicate SIJ determinations on behalf of Children as a matter of law. **Id.** at 18. I do not agree with that application of the holding in **Velasquez** and a comparison between **Velasquez** and the record in this appeal reveals critical differences.

Velasquez and her three children left Guatemala and began living in Pennsylvania by late 2018. **See Velasquez**, 321 A.3d at 883, 885. It appears Velasquez filed her custody petition in 2021, when the children were fourteen and eleven years old.¹³ At the 2022 hearing on her petition Velasquez testified to a detailed history of abuse at the hands of her children's father and his neglect from 2007 to 2018. **See Velasquez**, 321 A.3d at 883. The trial court thereafter made specific findings under the section 5328(a) custody factors and assigned "considerable" or "great weight" to Velasquez's accounts of the abuse perpetrated by the father, in front of the children, as well as the fact the father's family showed little-to-no concern about Velasquez. **Id.** at 886-87 (quotation marks omitted). The trial court further determined that, even when Velasquez and the father lived together in Guatemala, Velasquez

¹³ **See Velasquez v. Miranda**, 297 A.3d 837, 839 (Pa. Super. 2023), *rev'd*, 321 A.3d 876 (Pa. 2024).

performed the majority of parental duties and that since coming to the United States, the father performed no parental duties. **See id.** at 887. The trial court determined none of the custody factors weighed in the father's favor. **See id.** at 887. Thus, it awarded Velasquez sole legal and physical custody of the children based on its findings of fact and credibility determinations. **Id.** at 886-88.

Velasquez remains procedurally, legally, and factually distinguishable from the present case for several reasons, which militate a broader remand than suggested by the majority. First, in addition to the jurisdictional issue discussed by the majority, I believe the scope of remand should include proceedings to ensure service on Father had been properly effected.¹⁴

Second, in **Velasquez**, our Supreme Court had the benefit of dedicated findings of fact and credibility determinations from the trial court, which, in conjunction with the Supreme Court's comprehensive review of the record,

¹⁴ The issue of service was not at issue in **Velasquez** because the father apparently signed and accepted service of the custody complaint and hearing notice. **See Velasquez**, 321 A.3d at 883. This Court previously found "concerning" a petitioner's failure to demonstrate proper service, at least under Pennsylvania law. **Zayas v. Brizuela**, 1248 EDA 2024, 2025 WL 47505, at *1 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2025) (non-precedential memorandum) (noting that our Rules of Civil Procedure prohibit service by an adult related to a litigant to a party but declining to find that defect fatal when the trial court granted the request for custody and there was no precedent establishing a "relative of a relative-in-law" constituted a "relative" under Pa.R.Civ.P. 76's definition of a competent adult). In the present case, the only indication of service is that an adult relative of Mother attempted service in Guatemala: there are no return receipts for the mailings Mother's counsel sent Father, and no discussion of how service may be accomplished lawfully under Guatemalan law.

supported conclusions as a matter of law. **See Velasquez**, 321 A.3d at 906. In the present case, however, the trial court did not render any specific findings under any section 5328(a) custody factors but rather summarized the record and testimony that it determined unpersuasive or incredible. **See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law**, 10/17/25, at 3-5, 7-10. Furthermore, unlike **Velasquez**, the court did not issue the custody award not on any dedicated findings of fact as to Children's best interest, and instead awarded custody largely as a grudging decision based on the court's perception an award of custody to Mother was a *fait accompli*. **See id.** at 7-8. Although the trial court erred and abused its discretion in this regard, the absence of dedicated findings of fact and undisturbed credibility determinations in this case cautions against an appellate court rendering a decision to issue the predicate SIJ determination **as a matter of law**.

Third, the trial court's findings and the record in **Velasquez** indicated Velasquez fled Guatemala with her children in part to escape the father's abuse. However, the record here establishes Children remained in Guatemala **for at least six years after Mother arrived in the United States** with her sons. It bears repeating that **Velasquez** interpreted subsection (J) as requiring the trial court to determine not only the non-viability of reunification with a parent but also a child's best interests, specifically that "it would not be in the child's best interest to be returned to the child's or parent's previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence[.]" **See Velasquez**, 321 A.3d at 883; **see also** 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(ii). As

noted in ***Velasquez***, the predicate SIJ best interest determination requires the trial court to make an individualized assessment, consider factors it normally takes into account when making best interest determinations under Pennsylvania law, and decide the issue on a case-by-case basis. ***See Velasquez***, 321 A.3d at 904. Nevertheless, the predicate SIJ best interest determination—which focuses on whether a return of a child to a foreign country is not in the child’s best interests—asks a question not usually raised in a typical custody matter, and courts assessing the predicate SIJ best interest determination have engaged in at least some comparison of a child’s current circumstances in the United States, the circumstances the child would face if returned to his or her, or a parent’s, previous country of nationality, as well as “factors related to the circumstances of the child and the circumstances and capacity of potential caregiver(s).” ***See Velasquez***, 321 A.3d at 904 (quoting 6 USCIS PM J.2(C)(3)); ***accord Castillo v. Guerra***, --- A.3d ---, 2026 WL 1757862, at *7 (Pa. Super. June 18, 2026); ***Monroy v. Chavez***, 1033 EDA 2025, 2025 WL 2850744, at *5 (Pa. Super. Oct. 8, 2025) (noting evidence concerning a child’s life residing in Guatemala with his grandparents is not relevant to a court’s custody decision but is relevant to subsection (J)(ii)’s best interest determination). ***See also Guardianship of Saul H.***, 514 P.3d 871, 888 (Cal. 2022) (noting that the SIJ’s non-viability of reunification and best interest determinations are distinct and that the best interest determination focuses on the effects of sending a child back to live in their home country).

In the present case, Mother appears to have recognized the need to adduce at least some evidence on Children's circumstances were they to return to Guatemala to establish the SIJ best interest determination. For example, in her proposed findings of fact, Mother alleged Children did not feel safe in Guatemala because of crime and Father's abusive and violent behavior toward Mother, and, if Children returned to Guatemala, they would face problems with poverty, crime, and lack of educational and employment opportunities. **See** Proposed Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 5/27/25, at 9. The evidence at the hearing, however, fell short of proving those allegations or giving the court the information it required to make a determination about the predicate SIJ best interest determination.¹⁵

As noted above, K.R.A.G. testified Paternal Grandparents "mistreated [her] verbally and it was worse when they found out she was pregnant." N.T., 10/1/25, at 37. K.R.A.G. indicated Paternal Grandparents were verbally abusive to A.R.A.G. as well. **See id.**¹⁶ However, K.R.A.G. offered no evidence Paternal Grandparents were unwilling or unable to care for her, and presented

¹⁵ Whether it would be in Children's best interests not to return to Guatemala is not a typical custody question. However, when presented with a request for a predicate SIJ determination a Pennsylvania court must consider relevant Pennsylvania law. **See** 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a).

¹⁶ K.R.A.G. testified she wanted to live with Mother because Paternal Grandparents "mistreated her." N.T., 10/1/25, at 38.

no evidence about poverty, crime, or problems with education when she lived with them.¹⁷

A.R.A.G.'s testimony was even less probative that it was in her best interest not to return to Guatemala. When asked whether she agreed with Mother and K.R.A.G.'s testimony, she merely responded, "Yes." A.R.A.G. testified she preferred to live with Mother over living in Guatemala because she "feel[s] safer with [Mother,]" and she did not feel safe in Guatemala because Mother "wasn't with [her]." *Id.* at 40.

Finally, Mother's testimony did not give the trial court the evidence it needed to make a proper SIJ best interest determination. Mother added little

¹⁷ Indeed, K.R.A.G., arrived in Pennsylvania approximately one year before the hearing at approximately seventeen years old and managed to graduate high school despite being either pregnant or having a newborn child. Her ability to graduate from a high school in the United States under those circumstances strongly suggests she did not experience impediments to her education while living with Paternal Grandparents in Guatemala.

I acknowledge that in *Orellana*, this Court criticized a trial court for finding a mother's testimony that there was no one in her and her children's country of nationality who was ready, willing, or able to care for children incredible when there was extended family in that country and the mother was not forthcoming about availability of those family members. *See Orellana*, 353 A.3d at 224-25. In that case, however, we determined those facts did not "automatically render the rest of the testimony insufficient" to make a predicate SIJ best interest determination and noted that there was no record support for the possibility those relatives were willing or able to adequately care for the children. *Id.* The record, here, however, indicates Paternal Grandparents had been a resource and the only reason for their exclusion as a potential caretaker in Guatemala was the testimony of K.R.A.G., who would have been fifteen to seventeen years old when she lived with them, that they mistreated her verbally, which got worse after she got pregnant.

to the Children's testimony beyond the facts K.R.A.G is not currently working, she supports the baby, and A.R.A.G. is attending Toby Farms Elementary, doing well, and enjoys math. ***See id.*** at 28-29, 32-33. Significantly, when the trial court asked who cared for Children in Guatemala while Mother was in the United States, Mother testified she left Children with Maternal Grandmother but did not reference Paternal Grandparents or, more importantly, any conditions Children experienced when they remained in Guatemala with Paternal Grandparents.¹⁸ When asked why Children are better off in Pennsylvania than Guatemala, Mother simply responded, "Here, there's more safety[,] more opportunity to find a job, and you can support yourself with a job, but not in Guatemala." N.T., 10/1/25, at 29.

Under these circumstances, I cannot conclude Mother adduced a sufficient basis to find, as a matter of law, that it was in Children's best interest not to return to Guatemala. In the absence of specific evidence from which to render a proper predicate SIJ best interest determination, I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to require the trial court to issue SIJ determinations and accompanying findings of fact. I would remand this matter with instructions to the trial court to issue proper findings of fact and

¹⁸ Neither Mother nor Children testified to any contacts between them when Mother was in United States and Children remained in Guatemala. Moreover, the only testimony concerning a parent-child bond between Mother and the Children was A.R.A.G.'s testimony that she did not feel safe in Guatemala without Mother and currently felt safe with her.

conclusions of law, and, if necessary, to permit the presentation of additional evidence to resolve the lingering questions presented in this appeal.

In sum, while I agree the trial court erred and abused its discretion, a review of the record in this appeal reveals open questions as to whether Mother properly served Father and carried her burden to establish Children's entitlement to the predicate SIJ best interest determination. As in any custody matter, courts must engage in a case-specific and holistic review and not simply "rubber stamp" cases based on larger policy questions over immigration or the actual or perceived humanitarian benefits afforded by the SIJ statute. Therefore, rather than requiring the entry of the predicate SIJ determinations in this case, I would vacate the trial court's order and remand for further proceedings to resolve these questions using the appropriate legal mechanisms and standards, and, if necessary, to take further evidence.¹⁹

¹⁹ I recognize that the law regarding the SIJ status is, at least in Pennsylvania, a relatively new, unusual, and developing area of law, which may frustrate and confuse courts and litigants alike. Nevertheless, courts are bound to faithfully implement our Supreme Court's decision to require custody courts and other juvenile courts to consider the predicate SIJ determinations. Courts are bound to respect the growing precedent in this area, and the parties likewise should be expected to follow the applicable rules and burdens of proof.